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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Traci Hadden appeals from the district court's judgment summarily dismissing 
her petition for post-conviction relief. She asserts that the district court erred when it 
summarily dismissed three claims set forth in her verified amended petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Hadden filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief raising issues arising 
out of two criminal cases. (R., pp.20-32.) The first case involved a jury trial on a charge 
of grand theft (hereinafter, the grand theft case), following which Ms. Hadden was found 
guilty, receiving a unified sentence of fourteen years, with seven years fixed. The 
second case involved Ms. Hadden pleading guilty to one count of aiding and abetting 
attempted first degree murder and one count of grand theft by possession (hereinafter, 
the attempted murder case), for which she received concurrent unified sentences of 
fifteen years, with ten years fixed, on the aiding and abetting attempted first degree 
murder charge, and fourteen years, with four years fixed, on the grand theft by 
possession charge. The sentences in the attempted murder case were ordered to run 
concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentence in the grand theft case. 
(R., pp.88-89.) 
In the attempted murder case, Ms. Hadden was charged with aiding and abetting 
attempted first degree murder for her purported involvement in an attempt to kill her 
former father-in-law, Craig Hadden, an attempt that was perpetrated by her son, Blue 
1 
Hadden, and his friend Michael Cannon, grand theft for stealing all-terrain vehicles 
belonging to Craig Hadden, and solicitation of first degree murder of a police officer. 
(4/1/10 Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3, 12-13; Affidavit of 
Probable Cause in Support of Criminal Complaint/Citation, appended to 4/1/10 PSI, 
p.1.) The parties reached a binding Rule 11 plea agreement under the terms of which 
Ms. Hadden agreed to plead guilty to the charges of aiding and abetting attempted first 
degree murder and grand theft, in exchange for which the State agreed to dismiss the 
solicitation charge, along with an agreement with respect to the length of the fixed 
portions of the sentences to be imposed. Under the terms of the agreement, the district 
court was bound to impose concurrent sentences of ten years fixed on each count, with 
the parties free to argue as to the indeterminate portions of the sentences and whether 
the sentences should run concurrently or consecutively to the sentence in the grand 
theft case. (R., pp.54-55.) 
Following her sentencing In both cases, Ms. Hadden filed a verified pro se 
petition for post-conviction relief timely as to both underlying criminal cases. 1 (R., p.20.) 
1 The claims discussed in this brief are taken from the verified Amended Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief (R., pp.87-101 ), which was filed with permission of the district 
court following a stipulation by the parties. (R., pp.79-82.) After Ms. Hadden filed her 
original prose verified petition for post-conviction relief, the district court issued a Notice 
of Intent to Dismiss (R., p.35), followed by an order dismissing all but one of her claims 
but granting her earlier motion for the appointment of counsel. (R., pp.67-76.) In its 
order of dismissal, the district court noted, "the partial dismissal of the petition for 
reasons set forth above is an interlocutory order subject to reconsideration pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. Rule 11 (a)(2)." (R., p.75.) Because the district court's original order dismissing 
all but one claim was not final and the district court allowed the filing of an amended 
verified petition, Ms. Hadden will not separately address the dismissal of the claims 
contained in her verified pro se petition. 
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With respect to the attempted murder case, Ms. Hadden raised a number of 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, only two of which are relevant on appeal: (1) 
her attorney was ineffective for failing to move for a continuance of her sentencing 
hearing upon learning, just before that hearing, that she was under the influence of the 
prescription drug Effexor, causing her to feel "drugged," and preventing her from 
meaningfully participating in her sentencing hearing; and (2) her attorney was ineffective 
in failing to correct a statement incorrectly attributed to her in a psychological evaluation 
used at her sentencing hearing. (R., pp.91-92.) 
With respect to the grand theft case, Ms. Hadden raised a number of claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, only one of which is relevant on appeal, namely that 
her attorney failed to request a continuance following the receipt of a plea offer the day 
before trial, preventing her from having an adequate opportunity to consider the offer, 
which she would have accepted had she been given the chance to consider it. 
(R., pp.90-91.) 
The district court then issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Amended Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, in which it provided notice of why it intended to dismiss all but 
the claim that her attorney in the attempted murder case was ineffective for failing to file 
a notice of appeal.2 (R., pp.102-18.) Following Ms. Hadden's voluntary dismissal of her 
sole surviving claim, the district court issued a judgment of dismissal of all claims 
contained in her amended petition. (R., pp.277-78.) Ms. Hadden filed a Notice of 
Appeal timely from the Judgment of Dismissal. (R., p.280.) 
2 This claim, the only claim not summarily dismissed, is not addressed on appeal 
because Ms. Hadden voluntarily dismissed it at the evidentiary hearing. (R., p.277.) 
3 
ISSUE 




The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Hadden's Post-Conviction 
Claims 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Hadden asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed 
three post-conviction claims raised in her verified Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief alleging, in the attempted murder case, that her attorney was ineffective for failing 
to request a continuance when she told him, prior to the sentencing hearing, that she 
was under the influence of a psychotropic medication that was causing her to feel 
"drugged" and "very lethargic and foggy in [her] thinking," and by failing to correct a 
statement incorrectly attributed to her in a psychological evaluation, and, in the grand 
theft case, by failing to request a continuance to allow her time to consider a last-minute 
plea offer, which she would have accepted. 
B. Standards Of Review 
1. Summary Dismissal 
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. 
The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its 
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. 
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when the 
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by 
further proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case 
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where evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where State did not file a response to 
petition). However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required to accept the 
petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but it need not accept the petitioner's 
conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if a material issue 
of fact exists. I.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if 
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary 
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be held. Baldwin v. State, 145 
Idaho 148, 153 (2008). At the summary dismissal stage the petitioner need only 
present prima facie evidence of both prongs. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 
(2010). 
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903 
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v. 
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997). 
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2. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of 
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the 
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through its Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685. 
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on 
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth 
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the 
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
Mitchel/ v. State, 132 Idaho 274,279 (1998). 
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also 
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
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outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by 
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding 
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different," 
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly 
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner 
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Hadden's Post-
Conviction Claims 
1. The Effexor Claim 
In summarily dismissing Ms. Hadden's claim that her attorney in the attempted 
murder case was ineffective for failing to move for a continuance of her sentencing 
hearing upon learning, just before the hearing, that she was under the influence of the 
prescription drug Effexor, which caused her to feel "drugged" and unable to participate 
meaningfully in her sentencing hearing, the district court explained, 
The petitioner has not supported her petition with any medical records or 
proof that she was in fact prescribed Effexor or the effects of such 
medication. The transcript of the sentencing hearing does not indicate 
that her ability to participate was in any way affected by her alleged 
medication ... She has not attached any medical reports or prescriptions 
no[r] has she demonstrated how she has been prejudiced and has not 
shown that the court would have granted a continuance of the sentencing. 
She has not shown how the effect of her medication prevented her from 
participating in her own sentencing or that she was prejudiced. 
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(R., pp.267-68.) 
Ms. Hadden presented uncontroverted evidence that she was under the 
influence of a medication prescribed to her following "a mental breakdown" at the time 
of her sentencing hearing which left her feeling "very lethargic and foggy in [her] 
thinking," that she informed her attorney of this fact before the sentencing hearing, and 
that he told her "not to worry about it" because "this was a sentencing hearing and it 
didn't make any difference." (R., p.247.) Ms. Hadden asserts that, at the summary 
dismissal stage, the district court was required to accept the factual assertions, 
contained in her affidavit and verified amended petition, that she was under the 
influence of prescription medication at the time of her sentencing hearing, that she told 
her attorney about it, and that it impaired her ability to participate meaningfully in her 
sentencing hearing. 
Further supporting Ms. Hadden's contention that she was unable to participate 
meaningfully in her sentencing hearing is a portion of her affidavit addressing another 
claim that she made concerning the psychological evaluation conducted in her case.3 
With respect to that claim, Ms. Hadden wrote, 
That [defense counsel] did not attend the psychological evaluation I did 
with Dr. Richard Worst. That during the course of that evaluation, I told 
Dr. Worst, in response to a question from him, that I had no feelings 
regarding whether Mr. Hadden lived or died. That is to say, I did not feel 
strongly about it one way or the other. This statement by me was 
somehow misinterpreted by Dr. Worst and placed into his report as me 
saying Mr. Hadden's death would not have displeased me. I told [defense 
counsel] that this was not correct and I did not say that to Dr. Worst. That 
[defense counsel] did not object to that statement during the sentencing 
hearing. 
3 This claim is discussed separately infra. 
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(R., p.247.) At sentencing, the district court focused on the statement attributed to 
Ms. Hadden by Dr. Worst several times without interruption, clarification, or interjection 
by Ms. Hadden or her attorney. Specifically, the district court stated, 
And, clearly, I think that just because of the relationship that you had with 
Mr. Hadden, that was no justification whatsoever to want or, as you 
indicated in your evaluation and your statements to Dr. Worst, that while 
you denied having plotted or being involved in the killing, that certainly his 
death would not have displeased you. 
Now, it seems to me that if at the time you're talking to Dr. Worst and 
you're telling him that the death of Mr. Hadden would not have displeased 
you, to apologize today in many respects rings hollow for the Court 
because, clearly, I think you wanted Mr. Hadden dead for whatever 
reason. 
Again, I go back to the comment that you denied to Dr. Worst knowingly 
having conspired to kill Craig Hadden, but at the same time you admitted 
that his death would not have displeased you. 
The think that I find is the most aggravating, and I go back to this again, is 
the fact that irrespective of whether you had a leadership role in this 
matter, and I think you did based on the information that the Court has 
been provided because there's really no motive for either Mr. [Blue] 
Hadden or Mr. Cannon to want your ex-father-in-law dead. Clearly, you 
had a great deal of animosity towards your father-in-law for whatever 
reason. You don't like your father-in-law, and I think the comment to 
Dr. Worst that his death would not have displeased you tells me that of all 
three, you were the one who had the motive, for whatever reason, to want 
Mr. Hadden dead. 
(Sent.Tr., 4 p.32, L.4 - p.37, L.22 (emphases added).) 
Given Ms. Hadden's uncontroverted sworn statement denying having told 
Dr. Worst that the victim's death would not have displeased her and that she told her 
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attorney of this before the sentencing hearing, along with the district court's repeated 
references to the statement without objection from either Ms. Hadden or defense 
counsel, it is reasonable to infer that Ms. Hadden was not able to participate 
meaningfully in her sentencing hearing due to her being under the influence of a 
recently-prescribed psychotropic medication because she otherwise would have 
objected to the district court's repeated references to this incorrect statement. 
As for the district court's conclusion that Ms. Hadden failed to show that the court 
would have granted a continuance of her sentencing hearing if her attorney had 
informed the court of her condition, she cites to Idaho Code§ 18-210, which provides, 
"No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the 
proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, 
sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity 
endures." I.C. § 18-210 (emphasis added); see also State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 
62 (2003) ("The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right 
not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due 
process right to a fair trial."). 
Because, taking all reasonable inferences in Ms. Hadden's favor, there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Hadden was under the influence of a 
psychotropic medication that affected her ability to understand and meaningfully 
participate in the proceedings at the time of her sentencing hearing, a fact that her 
4 The sentencing transcript for the attempted murder case was judicially-noticed by the 
district court (R., p.106), but was not included in the appellate record. A file-stamped 
copy of the transcript was attached to a Motion to Augment filed on July 20, 2012. 
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attorney knew of before the hearing, she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this 
claim. 
2. Failure To Obiect To Dr. Worst's Report 
In summarily dismissing Ms. Hadden's claim that her attorney in the attempted 
murder case was ineffective for failing to object to a statement wrongly-attributed to her 
in a psychological report written by Dr. Worst that the victim's death "would not have 
displeased her" when she actually said she had "no feelings regarding whether 
Mr. Hadden lived or died" and "did not feel strongly about it one way or the other," the 
district court reasoned, 
She asserts that she informed her attorney of the mischaracterization of 
her statement by Dr. Worst and he failed to object. The petitioner certainly 
had every opportunity herself to correct or clarify any statements that she 
made and failed to do so. She could have done that at the time the court 
reviewed the PSI with the petitioner when she said she had no changes[,] 
corrections or objections to the content of the report. (Tr. pg. 5, L.8-13)[,] 
and at the time of her allocution (Tr. pg. 26, L. 12 - pg. 27, L. 9). In the 
view of this court whether his death would not have displeased her or 
whether she had no feeling whether [the victim] lived or died is a 
distinction without a difference. There is no showing that counsel was 
deficient in failing to object to the statements made to Dr. Worst. 
Therefore this claim must be dismissed. 
(R., pp.268-69.) The district court's decision summarily dismissing this claim appears to 
rest on the district court's erroneous conclusion that Ms. Hadden showed neither 
deficient performance because she could have objected to the information nor prejudice 
because the district court doesn't view the wrongly-attributed statement as being 
different from the correct statement. 
As relevant to the deficient performance prong, Ms. Hadden's affidavit included 
her claim that she was under the influence of a recently-prescribed psychotropic 
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medication at the time of her sentencing hearing, which left her feeling "drugged" and 
prevented her from meaningfully participating in her sentencing hearing. 5 (R., pp.91-
92.) As such, taking all reasonable inferences from the available record in favor of 
Ms. Hadden, as the district court was required to do at the summary judgment stage, 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Hadden was in a position to 
object, in her attorney's stead, to the wrongly-attributed statements relied upon by the 
district court at sentencing.6 This demonstrates that Ms. Hadden's claim raises a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the deficient performance prong. 
As relevant to the prejudice prong, the district court made numerous references 
to the comment, specifically, 
And, clearly, I think that just because of the relationship that you had with 
Mr. Hadden, that was no justification whatsoever to want or, as you 
indicated in your evaluation and your statements to Dr. Worst, that while 
you denied having plotted or being involved in the killing, that certainly his 
death would not have displeased you. 
Now, it seems to me that if at the time you're talking to Dr. Worst and 
you're telling him that the death of Mr. Hadden would not have displeased 
you, to apologize today in many respects rings hollow for the Court 
because, clearly, I think you wanted Mr. Hadden dead for whatever 
reason. 
Again, I go back to the comment that you denied to Dr. Worst knowingly 
having conspired to kill Craig Hadden, but at the same time you admitted 
that his death would not have displeased you. 
5 This claim was discussed supra. 
6 This, of course, assumes arguendo that an attorney's duty to make the district court 
aware of erroneous information contained in pre-sentencing materials is generally not 
considered deficient performance because a defendant could object on her own. 
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The think that I find is the most aggravating, and I go back to this again, is 
the fact that irrespective of whether you had a leadership role in this 
matter, and I think you did based on the information that the Court has 
been provided because there's really no motive for either Mr. [Blue] 
Hadden or Mr. Cannon to want your ex-father-in-law dead. Clearly, you 
had a great deal of animosity towards your father-in-law for whatever 
reason. You don't like your father-in-law, and I think the comment to 
Dr. Worst that his death would not have displeased you tells me that of all 
three, you were the one who had the motive, for whatever reason, to want 
Mr. Hadden dead. 
(Sent.Tr., p.32, L.4 - p.37, L.22 (emphases added).) 
Furthermore, while the district court claims that it considers the disputed version 
of the statement and Ms. Hadden's corrected version of the statement to be essentially 
the same (presumably meaning that it would not have changed the district court's 
sentencing decision had the statement been accurately presented), that is not the 
standard to be employed when analyzing the prejudice prong in post-conviction. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700 (a trial judge's testimony as to what he or she would have 
done absent the deficient performance "is irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry"). 
The clear implication of the statement erroneously attributed to Ms. Hadden by 
Dr. Worst was that Ms. Hadden would have been pleased to have learned that the 
victim died. The version of the statement that she asserts she made is far less 
damning, and indicates that she had no feelings on the subject whatsoever. 
Additionally, the meaning ascribed to the statement by the district court at the 
sentencing hearing shows that it was taken to mean something more than mere 
indifference; rather, it was used as an aggravating factor in the district court's decision 
to make the sentences in the attempted murder case consecutive to the sentence in the 
grand theft case, specifically as evidence that Ms. Hadden was the only one of the three 
participants in the crime with a motive to want the victim dead. Ms. Hadden asserts that 
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she has at least demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect 
to the prejudice prong. 
3. The Plea Offer Continuance Claim 
In summarily dismissing Ms. Hadden's claim that her attorney was ineffective for 
failing to move for a continuance of trial following the receipt of a pre-trial offer the day 
before trial, the district court explained, 
If the petitioner wanted to consider plea negotiations she could have 
initiated them long prior to the commencement of the trial. The mere 
desire to consider a plea offer is not good cause to continue a jury trial 
and that petitioner had at least five days from the time the jury was 
selected before opening statements to decide whether t[o] accept the 
state's offer. The court would not have continued the trial on the grounds 
asserted by the petitioner and therefore any such motion would not have 
been granted. 
(R., pp.261-62.) 
The problem with the district court's conclusion is that it assumes a factual 
scenario that is unsupported by the record and relies on an apparent misunderstanding 
of the scope of its own discretion. First, it assumes that no plea negotiations were 
initiated by defense counsel prior to the receipt of the offer the day before trial. Second, 
it appears to conclude mistakenly that, as a matter of law, "the mere desire to consider 
a plea offer is not good cause to continue a jury trial .... " Finally, it assumes that the 
plea offer would have remained open following the start of trial. Additionally, the district 
court's conclusion that it would not have granted the motion had it been made relies on 
its own apparent misunderstanding of the law concerning continuances.7 
7 The only evidence as to what transpired with respect to the plea offer comes from 
Ms. Hadden's affidavit in support of her petition in which she explained that her attorney 
visited her in custody the day before trial was to begin, presented a plea offer, that she 
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"The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court." State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 706 (1993). In reviewing 
a discretionary decision on appeal, this Court considers: "(1) whether the lower court 
rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the 
outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." Id. 
The United States Supreme Court has found that a proper analysis of prejudice 
1n post-conviction cases "should not depend on the idiosyncrasies of the particular 
decisionmaker, such as unusual propensities toward harshness or leniency." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Thus, a trial judge's testimony regarding what he or she 
would specifically have done absent an attorney's deficient performance "is irrelevant to 
the prejudice inquiry." Id. at 700. Rather, a proper "assessment of prejudice should 
proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and 
impartially applying the standards that govern the decision." Id. at 695. 
In this case, the district court appears to have believed that it would not have had 
the discretion to find good cause and grant a motion for a continuance based on 
Ms. Hadden's "mere desire" to consider the State's plea offer. By apparently failing to 
recognize that its decision was a discretionary one, the district court abused its 
discretion in concluding that it would not have granted a motion for a continuance if it 
"was given no more than thirty (30) minutes to discuss the plea offer with [counsel] and I 
did not fully understand the plea offer which had been made." She noted that she 
requested that her attorney request a continuance "[t]o allow me additional time in which 
to consider the plea offer before making a decision," a request that her attorney refused 
to make. (R., pp.241-42.) 
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had been made. Furthermore, the district court erred by relying on what it would have 
done had the motion been made, information that was irrelevant to the prejudice 
determination under Strickland.8 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Hadden respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the district court's judgment of dismissal as to the three claims discussed above, 
and remand this matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the claims. 
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2012. 
€PEN9)ER J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
8 This case is more troubling than the after-the-fact testimony of the trial judge in 
Strickland because, at least in that case, the judge was a witness subject to cross-
examination, rather than the judge summarily dismissing post-conviction relief. 
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